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On Relating Social Sciences to International Law:
Three Perspectives
Yifeng Chen

Abstract
This Essay offers a critical yet constructive reading of the social science approach to
international law. In seeking to frame international legal studies alongside the positivistic social
sciences, the social science approach has suffered from important methodological deficiencies.
Though appearing to be an objective science, the social science approach requires a scholar to make
subjective decisions throughout the research process. A reductionistic social science approach to
international law risks consolidating existing inequalities and imperialistic institutions in the
name of objective science. A healthy interaction between international law and the social sciences
requires enriched conceptions of both international law and the social sciences, as well as a proper
perspective on their working relationship. This dynamic perspective recognizes the constitutive role
of international law in carrying out the social science approach. It further emphasizes the
importance of internalizing interdisciplinarity within international legal scholarship itself.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
The social science approach to international law, as advocated by Daniel
Abebe, Adam Chilton, and Tom Ginsburg, is a recent academic effort to frame
international legal studies alongside the positivistic, fact-based, and empirical
social sciences. The social science approach starts “with a healthy skepticism about
the efficacy of law” and tests “hypotheses about how international law works in
practice” through observation and data collection.1 By describing and explaining
what the world is, the social science approach reclaims the methodological rigor,
scientism, and legitimacy of international law.
The social science approach should be understood within the context of the
law and society movement of American legal academia, which harbors a longstanding tradition of skepticism toward the normative-formalistic concept of law.
Its application to international law motivates a wide range of approaches including
the New Haven School,2 economic analysis of international law,3 international law
and international relations,4 international law as behavior,5 the empirical turn,6 the
experimental turn,7 and others. Yet, at a time when international law is increasingly
perceived as “indeterminate and illegitimate” in the United States,8 the call for a
social science approach may be understood as an attempt to reclaim its domestic
relevance by recourse to empirical methods and scientism.
Contrary to a simplistic polarization between the normative approach and
empirical research, this Essay suggests that the relationship between international
law and the social sciences is complex and nuanced. A detailed account of their
relationship casts light on the possibilities and limitations of the social science
approach, and also provides useful insights for developing an inclusive and
engaging international legal scholarship.

1

See Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law,
22 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 19, 5 (2021).

2

See generally Oran R. Young, International Law and Social Science: The Contributions of Myres S. McDougal,
66 AM. J. INT’L L. 60 (1972); WESLEY L. GOULD & MICHAEL BARKUN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1970).
See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).

3
4

See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations: A Dual Agenda,
87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205 (1993).

5

See generally Harlan Grant Cohen & Timothy Meyer, International Law as Behavior, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS BEHAVIOR 1 (Harlan Grant Cohen & Timothy Meyer eds., 2021).

6

See generally Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship,
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012).

7

See generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, Experimenting with International Law, 28 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 1317 (2017).

8

See Paul B. Stephan, Comparative International Law, Foreign Relations Law, and Fragmentation, in
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (Anthea Roberts et al. eds., 2018).
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II. S OCIAL S CIENCES W ITHIN I NTERNATIO NAL L AW
The traditional, normative approach to international law is not at all
antagonistic to scientism. 9 Instead, the normative approach seeks to build its
legitimacy and relevance by a claim to normative objectivity and certainty. Rules
are objective, their meanings are ascertainable, and they separate international law
from both morality and politics.
Under the normative approach, the main task of international lawyers is to
ascertain and clarify rules of international law in an objectively verifiable way. As
international law is represented as a system of objective rules and principles, the
idea of scientism deeply informs its doctrinal construction. International law is
discoverable through a process of neutral scientific inquiry, and the
authoritativeness of the norms depends upon the correct application of the
scientific method to international law.
The scientific nature of international law is crystalized in the doctrine of its
sources. The idea of scientism has been used to enhance the credibility of
international law as a discipline in the eyes of politicians and theorists.10 It also
embodies the positivistic tradition of international law.11 It is no surprise that the
rise of positivism is accompanied by the corresponding infusion of scientism into
international legal studies.
The normative approach is not blind to sociology, either. Rather, it has its
own conceptions of sociology, power, and knowledge. Beneath the construction
of the doctrine lies a profound sociological understanding of the international
society.12 For example, positivism reflects the political reality of the monopolistic
position of the nation-state in international relations, marginalizing the role of
nonstate actors in the making of international law. In recognizing the
decentralized structure of international society, positivism also privileges the great
powers in the lawmaking process.
A close look at the doctrine of customary international law illustrates the
underlying sociology. Secondary rules on the ascertainment of customary law
express the sociological reality of international society. The requirement of

9
10

11

12

See Anne Orford, Scientific Reason and the Discipline of International Law, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369 (2014).
See L. Oppenheim, Science of International Law Its Tasks and Method, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 313, 323–24
(1908).
See Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International
Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 18 (1999).
For a useful account on positivism from the lens of normative politics, see Benedict Kingsbury,
Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of Power and Oppenheim’s Positive
International Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 401 (2002).

40

Vol. 22 No. 1

Relating Social Sciences to International Law

Chen

concreteness is to render as much as possible the proposed norm in conformity
with existing state practice.13
There are many telling examples in this regard. For a new rule to emerge,
state practice has to be extensive and virtually uniform.14 Further, the practice of
the “specifically affected states” is given full weight. 15 In conceding to the
dominant role of great powers, physical acts are weighed more heavily than verbal
acts. The “persistent objector” doctrine is practically reserved for those states who
can persistently object to an emerging rule, despite it being affirmed by a great
majority of states—a possibility only open to a handful of great powers.16
In setting the law-making procedures, international law internalizes its
perceptions of prevailing social conditions. The sociological account is implicit in
the normative approach. Yet, international legal scholars have traditionally stayed
silent on those normative ideals about the world. Once entering the realms of the
sociological and the political, it would be a self-defeating exercise to an
international law project that claims to reject politics and morality. By convention,
international lawyers are trained as experts in normative jurisprudence, rather than
as social or political scientists. This mindset of avoidance has had structural
impacts on the works of international lawyers. It has curtailed the ambition and
willingness of international lawyers to engage with external disciplines. It also
causes confusion for many who are trapped in the formalistic approach and yet
see the political disagreements not surmountable by legal techniques. With the rise
of critical international law scholarship in the late 1980s, the objectivity claim of
normative international law has decisively fallen apart.

III. S OCIAL S CIENCE A P PROACH TO I NTERNATIONAL L AW
The social science approach suggested by Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg
examines the phenomenon of international law by using conventional, empirical,
and positivistic social sciences. 17 This external approach may be conveniently
referred to as the social science approach to international law. The basic procedure
13

On the irresolvable tension between concreteness and normativity, see generally MARTTI
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENT (2005).

14

See North Sea Continental Shelf (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 74 (Feb.
20).

15

Id.
In rediscovering the importance of the persistent objector doctrine due to the changing conditions
of international lawmaking, Ted Stein claimed her work to be “an exercise in the sociology of
international law.” See Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent
Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 481 (1985). A critical reading of the persistent
objector doctrine is well argued by B. S. Chimni, Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective,
112 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 23–25 (2018).
See generally Abebe et al., supra note 1.

16

17
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is to start with a research question, develop a hypothesis, then verify or falsify the
hypothesis through observation and data collection. In reducing and limiting its
research task to descriptive engagement without a normative commitment, the
social science approach advocates a revitalization of the scientific enterprise of
international law.
In a sense, the social science approach and the normative approach share a
common interest in scientism and objectivity despite the profound difference
between the two approaches. The social science approach replaces the
normatively-committed objective rules with a new set of empirically-committed
objective rules. The scientism of the social science approach also needs to be
demystified.
The social science approach is premised upon the full separation between
the subjective and the objective. 18 It further assumes the objective being real,
fixed, unmalleable, and organized – capable of scientific studies without subjective
intervention. This approach is epistemologically incomplete, if not completely
impossible. First, no social science is completely neutral, objective, and value-free.
Social sciences are as politically informed as international legal studies. The
application of the social science approach to international law requires a scholar
to make many subjective choices throughout the research process. In defining the
research question, setting the context, identifying the variables, relating variables
as cause and consequence, collecting and interpreting the data, establishing the
causal link, generalizing the research outcomes, and more, one is constantly called
to make subjective decisions.19 Those delicate decisions are not readily accessible
in the disciplinary toolboxes of social sciences or international law. Instead, one
must make decisions creatively.
How contrary state practice is treated in identification of customary
international law provides an illustrative example. Torture is prohibited by the
1984 U.N. Convention against Torture. 20 Given that the practice of torture is
widely found across the world, the question immediately arises whether customary
international law authorizes or prohibits torture.21 The techniques employed by
the traditional approach elaborate and define what counts as state practice. One
answer is to exclude those practices of torture from the purview of “state
18
19

See BARRY HINDESS, PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 138–39 (1977).
The range of subjective selection is manifestly acknowledged in the classics on quantitative social
research. See, e.g., GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL
INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994).

20

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.

21

This was a point of debate between Arthur Weisburd and Anthony D’Amato in the 1980s on
whether the prohibition of torture was purely conventional by nature. See Arthur M. Weisburd,
Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1988); Anthony
D’Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Response to Professor Weisburd, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 459 (1988).
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practice.” For the purpose of customary lawmaking, state practice is normgenerative only if it is accompanied by an opinio juris.22 Because no state has claimed
that torture is lawful under international law, the practice of torture would not be
able to create a law permissible of torture.
The other technique is to define state practice by pairing actions with
responses from other states.23 Whenever incidents of torture are exposed, they are
deplored by other states and human rights organizations. It is the acts of torture
by a state together with the collective responses from other states that constitute
state practice on the legality of torture under international law. Both techniques
are presented as factual matters of what to observe and what counts.
Second, observations and interpretations generate the world we see.
Personal preferences, beliefs, values, or research methods often determine
research outcomes. In essence, social science is about constructing narratives and
order. Data only receive meaning when they are theoretically exposed and
interpreted. Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg provide an illuminating example in
their article. Using basically the same data, Beth Simmons and Eric Posner drew
opposite conclusions about the effectiveness of international human rights
agreements.24
Another useful example could be found on the scholarly examination of the
breadth of the territorial sea. According to a survey conducted by the United
Nations in 1983, 18 states claimed 3 nautical miles of territorial sea, 83 states
claimed 12 nautical miles, 13 states claimed 200 nautical miles, and another 19
states claimed different ranges.25 The question is then how far the territorial sea
reaches under customary international law.
The above claims are open to different interpretations. One interpretation
could simply deny the existence of customary international law on the subject
matter, as state practices diverge. 26 Another interpretation may suggest the
continued validity of the rule of 3 miles, as this is the least disputable. 27 Still
22
23

24

25
26

27

See North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, at ¶ 77.
See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A
Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 754, 784 (2001).
See Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 21 (discussing BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009) and ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014)).
The Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 2, vi, U.N. Doc. 83-35821 (Dec. 1983).
Michael Byers therefore interprets the 3 nautical miles as a mistaken belief among scholars on the
customary breadth of the territorial sea. See Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules Customary International Law from an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 109, 173 (1995).
See R.Y. Jennings, General Course on Principles of Public International Law, 121 COLLECTED COURSES
HAGUE ACAD. INT’L L. 323, 379 (1967). Yet, for a rational choice explanation of the 3 nautical miles
rule and its subsequent development, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1158 (1999).
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another interpretation points to the rule of 12 miles, as this rule is endorsed by
the majority and also incorporates the latest development in state practice.28
All of the above interpretations stand equally. A choice can be made only by
reference to policy considerations and normative commitments beyond mere
factual observation. More importantly, the difference between interpretations is
irresolvable within the social science approach itself as Abebe, Chilton, and
Ginsburg seem to suggest.29 The difference does not lie in observations, but rather
in assumptions and orientations.
Third, by reducing itself to the study of what “is,” the social science approach
risks consolidating and legitimizing existing social structure and order. The social
science approach gives authenticity to empirical facts and data by assuming that
the truth may be meaningfully extracted from the given. Yet, what is the being,
what aspects of social life are real, and what is observable are all at the heart of
the positivism of social sciences. Objectifying certain aspects of social life to
present them as irresistible and capable of generating meaning and order has
profound intellectual, social, and political implications. 30 Having renounced a
political commitment in the first place, the social science approach is left to be fed
by dominant narratives about world reality. Expressly not committing oneself to
a normative project amounts to a normative commitment in its own right.

IV. R ELATING I NTERNATIONAL L AW TO S OCIAL S CIENCES
The social science approach is primarily concerned with international law’s
efficacy and rationale. It focuses “on external questions like why states make
international commitments, how international institutions make decisions, and
whether international commitments or the decisions of international institutions
produce changes in state behavior.” 31 The social science approach, as such,
incorporates rather specific parochial concepts of both international law and social
science. This reductionist approach may hinder a more dynamic and interactive
discourse between international law and social science.
The social science approach suffers from three reductionist deficiencies. The
first is its positivistic conception of the social science method. In limiting itself to
the empirical method and external explanation, the social science approach, as
proposed by Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg, 32 minimizes the contributions of
28

29

Those arguing for 200 nautical miles are not seen as persistent objectors to the customary rule of
12 nautical miles. See Bing Bing Jia, The Relations Between Treaties and Custom, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L.
81, 89 (2010).
See Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 21–22.

30

For an insightful account of the ordering power of description, see Anne Orford, In Praise of
Description, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 609 (2012).

31

See Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 18.
Id.

32
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political science, anthropology, linguistics, or history. It focuses on efficacy and
causality to the exclusion of other analytic paradigms, such as structuralfunctionalism, hermeneutics, critical theory, and systems theory.
The second reductionist aspect is its conception of international law. The
social science approach incarnates a robust positivist and statist concept of law.
International law is seen as consisting of binding rules and principles whose effects
are to endure test by empiricism. However, in international society, the
constitutive role of international law is as relevant as its normative function. While
a rule-based formalistic notion of international law still stands firm, especially in
international adjudication, other concepts receive increasing acceptance.
International law is a language of empowerment that legitimizes specific
claims or actions. By formulating conceptual, paradigmatic, or epistemic
frameworks, it conditions our understanding of international problems and
defines the available solutions. The role and relevance of international law are
much richer than what the positivistic concept may embrace.
The normativity of international law may be considered in a dual agenda:
authoritative in adjudication and decision-making, but also normative in terms of
its political commitments. The traditional approach presents it as a system of rulebased normativity without normative projects other than international law itself.
Disconnecting these two levels of normativity is artificial and leads to the practical
irrelevance of international law to international life.
The third reductionist aspect is the relationship between international law
and social science. The social science approach depicts these as two distinct fields
which only relate to each other externally. In fact, they are mutually constitutive.
It is important to appreciate the constitutive role of concepts and doctrines of
international law in the design of the research project, as well as in the
interpretation of the results.
Nevertheless, an enriched social science approach would provide useful
insights for developing international law projects. The mechanisms of causation
and attribution are powerful institutions for social redistribution.33 For example,
the underlying causes of poverty in the Global South are subject to different
interpretations. In turn, these different interpretations point to different
prescriptions. Poverty may be seen as a consequence of the corruption and failure
of local governments. It may also be attributed to the lack of legal institutions for
privatization, property protection, or effective markets. Additionally, it may be
attributable to the structural status of countries in the Global South in the
international economic system. Each of these interpretations may be equally valid
and yet points to different prescriptions. Here, causation plays an important role
in conditioning our understanding of what the world problem is, who shall bear
33

For an insightful exposition and critique of causational analysis applied to human rights issues, see
Susan Marks, Human Rights and Root Causes, 74 MOD. L. REV. 57 (2011).
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responsibilities, and where to look for possible solutions. A social science project
would be useful to substantiate the normative projects of international law
regarding global poverty.
A modest and self-reflective social science approach is useful, but not
because it provides objective, verifiable scientific knowledge. Rather, it offers a
way to understand how international legal problems may be defined, how the
order of the world may be depicted, and how politics of international law may be
conducted at a micro level.
I would suggest an active incorporation of the social sciences into
international law. Various arguments against international legal studies as a social
science can be anticipated. Philosophically, the normative system of international
law cannot be subjected to Popper’s falsificationist approach, falling under the
criteria of science.34 Conceptually, the normative approach to law—sometimes
referred to as the authority paradigm—tells very little about international society.35
Intellectually, the social science approach often entertains skepticism or even
hostility toward the legal nature of international law, and a call for interdisciplinary
engagement often means conquest in reality.36 Politically, much of the existing
work on the social science approach is viewed as conservative. 37
Yet, it is both important and possible to relate international law to social
science in a more dynamic and mutually informative manner. There are several
useful ways to relate the two subjects. The first possibility is to open the normative
approach by relocating its background assumptions to the foreground for
discussion.38 In approaching international law as a project for social reform, it is
useful to openly acknowledge the sociological assumptions and political ideals that
underlie the international law project. To make those assumptions explicit would
do away with the false normative objectivity that has been associated with
international law. Connecting legal normativity with political normativity would
enable more direct engagement with foundational ideas about the world in
international legal discourse. And any reflections of those assumptions would
practically require sociological investigation and political engagement.

34

See KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 40–42 (1959).

35

For discussion of the authority paradigm, see Geoffrey Samuel, Is Law Really a Social Science? A View
from Comparative Law, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 288 (2008).

36

See Jan Klabbers, The Relative Autonomy of International Law or the Forgotten Politics of Interdisciplinarity, 1
J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 35 (2005).

37

See Martti Koskenniemi, Law, Teleology and International Relations: An Essay in Counterdisciplinarity, 26
INT’L REL. 3, 16 (2012).

38

See DAVID KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE: HOW POWER, LAW,
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 114 (2016).
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A second way of relating is to openly examine the constitutive role of
international law in social science. 39 International law today is a powerful
institution that determines how international issues are framed and resolved. Its
politics is often expressed in the politics of competing perspectives and outlooks.
The empirical approach requires theoretical sensitivity in its normative
assumptions, intellectual reflection about the subjective decisions made in
selecting and processing data, and prudence when drawing normative conclusions
from collected facts.
The third way of relating is to conduct interdisciplinary projects internal to
international law. International law projects by themselves are capable of speaking
to historians, political scientists, and scholars of international relations. As Jan
Klabbers comments, “the best work in international law tends to be individual
work that is well-informed about neighboring disciplines, and would be readable
and understandable to those neighboring disciplines, and perhaps even contribute
something to those disciplines, without however losing its distinctively legal
character.” 40 Those works are read as legal works par excellence. This raises
interesting questions about what constitutes an internal approach to international
law and where to draw its disciplinary boundaries. To conduct interdisciplinary
projects internal to the discipline of international law would require international
lawyers to be open-minded to the social sciences, and more importantly, be able
to internalize those neighboring disciplines in the landscape of legal research.

V. C ONCLUSION
What distinguishes international law from domestic law is its constitutive
role for international society. International law always points to the future and is
an enterprise that constantly aims to transcend the contemporary conditions of
human life. International law has constantly been formulated by professionals as
a project for social reform. International legal scholarship, the social science
approach included, by itself is part of the international lawmaking process.
The legitimacy of international law should not take refuge in objectivity or
scientism. The validity of international law may not come from an external
verification through economics or sociology. A reductionistic social science
approach to international law risks consolidating existing inequalities and
imperialistic institutions in the name of objective science. Such an approach may
also reduce international law to a set of policy options coded in administrative
vocabulary. As international law constantly oscillates between faith, normativity,
and theology on the one end and practice, facts, and science on the other, it is
39

40

Early calls for such interdisciplinary collaboration go back to the 1980s. See, e.g., Christopher C.
Joyner, Crossing the Great Divide: Views of a Political Scientist Wandering in the World of International Law,
81 PROCEEDINGS ANN. MEETING AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 385 (1987).
Klabbers, supra note 36, at 45.
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important to steer it as an intellectual space for rational discourse, as well as a
political space for progressive social projects.
A healthy interaction between international law and the social sciences
requires enriched conceptions of both, as well as a proper perspective on their
working relationship. It is important for international law to absorb a socialhistorical perspective and transform legal scholarship from an authority paradigm
to a more socially informed and politically relevant intellectual project.
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